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APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION
AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA V SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)
STATHIS PALASSIS·
I INTRODUCTION
On 26 February 2007 the International Court of Justice ('ICJ') handed down
its long-awaited judgment in the case concerning application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro).· The Court adjudicated alleged
violations by Serbia and Montenegro ('Serbia') of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,2 examining whether
genocide occurred during the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina ('Bosnia')
and, if it did, whether those actions could be attributed to Serbia. The Court
found that Serbia had not committed genocide, but had violated obligations to
prevent genocide and to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia ('ICTy,).3 The Court also found that the award of
compensatory damages was not appropriate in this case. The case has generated
public division over the Court's reasoning on difficult jurisdictional questions, as
well as the characterisation of, and responsibility for, atrocities committed. The
fact alone that the case concerns alleged breaches of the jus cogens prohibition
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December 1945, 7S UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951) ('Genocide Convenlion').
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ('ICTY') was established on S May 1993
pursuant to Security Council Resolution SOS: SC Res SOS, UN SCOR, 4Sth sess, 3I75th mtg, UN Doc
SlRes/SOS (1993) ('Resolution SOS'). The Tribunal's establishment is provided for by Security Council
resolution S27: Establishment ofthe International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia SC Res
S27, UN SCOR, 4Sth sess, 3217th mtg, UN Doc SIRes/S27 (1993) ('Resolution S27'). The Tribunal's
Statute ('ICTY Statute') was originally published as Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to [2] of Resolution SOS.
Copyright of Full Text rests with the original copyright owner and, except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, copying this copyright material is prohibited without the permission of the owner or
its exclusive licensee or agent or6yway ora licence from Copyright AgencyTimifea.-For information about such licences contact Copyright Agency Limited on (02) 93947600 (ph) or (02) 93947601 (fax)
2008 Convention o/the Prevention and Punishment o/the Crime o/Genocide
n THEFACTS
81
Until its dissolution in the early 1990s the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia ('SFRY') occupied a large part of the Balkan Peninsula.4 During its
dissolution regional ethnic, religious and territorial tensions flared up, resulting
in frequent and serious breaches of norms of international criminal law,
particularly in Bosnia. On 20 March 1993 Bosnia initiated proceedings against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ('FRY') seeking recognition of Serbia's
responsibility for ethnic cleansing and other atrocities committed in Bosnia. The
claim was based on apprehended violations by Serbia of international obligations
owed to Bosnia under the Genocide Convention.
As the conflict was still continuing when proceedings were commenced,
Bosnia also filed a request for the indication of provisional measures and then
further requests for the indication of provisional measures. In the order of 8 April
1993, the Court unanimously ordered that the FRY take all measures within its
power to prevent commission of genocide.s Further, the Court indicated by
thirteen to one that the FRY should
ensure that any military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which may be
directed or supported by it, as weIl as any organisations and persons which may be
subject to its control, dtrection or influence, do not commit any acts of genocide, of
conspiracy to commit genocide, of direct and public incitement to commit
genocide, or of complicity in genocide.6
In the order of 13 September 1993 the Court by thirteen to two reaffirmed the
provisional measures indicated in paragraphs 52A(1) and (2) of the order of 8
April 1993.7 In a separate opinion, Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht indicated that the
prohibitions should have contained further details. In particular, the prohibition
should have extended to the provision of weapons, ammunition, military supplies
and financial, commercial or any other aid, except of a strictly humanitarian
character, to any forces, authorities or individuals involved in the hostilities, and
to 'ethnic cleansing,.8 His Excellency then added that both sides must, inter alia,
comply with the ceasefire, release all detainees, allow free movement within
4 The Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was created in 1943, renamed the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia in 1946, and then the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ('SFRY') in 1963. Its territory
covered the present states of: Bosnia and Herzegovina ('Bosnia'), Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. The SFRY was disintegrated between 1991
and 1992, and replaced by successor states. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ('FRY'), comprising the
republics of Serbia and Montenegro, existed between 1992 and 2003. In 2003 it was reconstituted as
confederated Serbia and Montenegro, and in June 2006 Montenegro declared its independence. Kosovo
was an international protectorate and part ofSerbia until its declaration of independence on 17 February
2008.
5 Application o/the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o/the Crime o/Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) (Request/or the Indication 0/Provisional
Measures) [1993] ICJ Rep 3, [52A(I)].
6 Ibid [52A(2)].
7 Application o/the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o/the Crime o/Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) (Further Requests/or the Indication 0/Provisional
Measures) [1993] ICJ Rep 325, [61].
8 Ibid [123A].
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Bosnia, refrain from further destruction of ethnical and cultural institutions, and
to immediately end all discriminatory acts.9
There were also two previous judgments in the case, those of 11 July 1996 and
3 February 2003. The judgment of 11 Julrc 1996 concerns preliminary objections
between 29 April and 3 May 1996. 0 The objections primarily concern
jurisdiction and the FRY's status vis-a-vis the SFRY and the extent of the FRY's
international obligations. The Court dismissed FRY's objections and found that
at the time of application there was jurisdiction conferred by Article IX of the
Genocide Convention. I I The Court pointed to a diplomatic note dated 27 April
1992 from Yugoslavia's Permanent Mission to the United Nations ('UN')
Secretary-General where it was stated, inter alia, that:
The assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at its session held on
27 April 1992, promulgated the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Under the Constitution, on the basis of the continuing personality of
Yugoslavia and the legitimate decisions b>, Serbia and Montenegro to continue to
live together in Yugoslavia, the SocialIst Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
transformed into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of the Republic of
Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro.
Strictly respecting the continuity of the international personality of Yugoslavia, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall continue to fulfil all the rights conferred to,
and obligations assumed by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
international relations, including its membership in all international organizations
and participation in international treaties ratified or acceded to by Yugoslavia. 12
The judgment of 3 February 2003 concerns an application for revision of the
1996 judgment. 13 Based on certain new information: that the FRY was not a UN
member until 1 November 2000; that it did not continue the personality of the
SFRY; and was at material times not a UN member, not party to the Statute ofthe
International Court of Justice,14 and not party to the Genocide Convention,
Yugoslavia applied for revision of the 1996 judgment. 1S The Court found
9 Ibid [124).
10 Application a/the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment a/the Crime a/Genocide (Bosnia and
HerzegOVina v Yugoslavia) (Preliminary Objections) [1996] ICJ Rep 595 (' 1996 judgment').
II Article IX provides: '[d]isputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation,
application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility ofa
State for genocide or for any other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International
Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute': Genocide Convention, opened for
signature 9 December 1948,78 UNTS 277, art IX (entered into force 12 January 1951).
12 Dragomir Djokic, Leller Dated 6 May 1002/rom the Charge D'Affairesa.i. a/the Permanent
Mission a/Yugoslavia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, UN GAOR, 46lh sess.
Annex I, 2, UN Doc.N46/915 (1992).
13 Application/or Revision a/the Judgment 0/11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning the Application o/the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment a/the Crime a/GenOCide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v
Yugoslavia) (Preliminary Objections) (Yugoslavia v Bosnia and Herzegovina) [2003] ICJ Rep 7 ('2003
judgment').
14 S/atute o/the International Cour/ 0/Jus/ice at International Court of Justice ('ICl') <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocuments/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3~> at 28 March 2008.
15 Djokic, above n 12, [18].
-_._----------------------------
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Yugoslavia's Article 61 request inadmissible: 16 'A fact which occurs several
years after a judgment has been given is not a "new" fact within the meaning of
Article 61 ... irrespective of the legal consequences that such a fact may have.' 17
The FRY's admission to the UN in 2000, well after the 1996 judgment, cannot be
considered a new fact, supporting the request for revision of the judgment. IS
III TIlE JUDGMENT
Despite the fact that the case was initially filed in 1993, hearings were not
opened until 27 February 2006 and final judgment was handed down on 26
February 2007, 14 years after the initial filing. The Court's 15 judges produced a
563 page judgment containing a 171 page majority judgment, and declarations,
opinions and dissenting opinions of an additional 392 pages. The Court, inter
alia, came to the following conclusions:
(1) The finding of res judicata of the 1996 judgment precluded reopening of
thejurisdictional question and thereby provided the Court with jurisdiction
to consider the merits of the case.
(2) States can be held responsible for violating provisions of the Genocide
Convention.
(3) The only genocidal acts in Bosnia were those of July 1995 at Srebrenica.
(4) The Srebrenica genocidal acts could not be attributed to Serbia.
(5) Serbia was responsible for failure to prevent and punish the Srebrenica
genocide.
(6) Satisfaction was appropriate reparation.
A Jurisdiction
Serbia argued no jurisdiction on the basis that the FRY did not continue the
legal personality of the SFRY, therefore making it not a party to the Genocide
Convention, the Charter of the United Nations, nor the Statute of the
International Court of Justice when proceedings were commenced. 19 Serbia
maintained that as the UN had not recognised the FRY as continuator of the
SFRY, the FRY was not a member until 2000 when the newly-elected President
Ko§tunica applied for UN membership on behalf of the FRY. By ten to five, the
Court rejected Serbia's argument, concluding that the 1996 judgment carried the
force of res judicata thus precluding any reopening of the decision embodied in
16 Article 61(1) provides: '[a]n application for revision ofajudgment may be made only when it is based
upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the
judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that
such ignorance was not due to negligence': Statute ofthe International Court ofJustice, art 61(1).
17 2003 judgment, [2003]ICJ Rep 7, [67].
18 Ibid [68].
19 Genocide case, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocketlindex.php?p1=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, [80].
- ~----~-~ ------~-~-------------------------------------------
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that judgment, and thereby providing jurisdiction to adjudicate through Article
IX of the Genocide Convention.2o The Court noted:
The operative part of the 1996 Judgment stated ... that the Court found "that, on
the basis of Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, it had jurisdiction to decide upon the dispute." That jurisdiction
is established with the full weight of the court's judicial authority. For a party to
assert today that, at the date the 1996 Judgment was given, the Court has no power
to give it, because one of the parties can now be seen to have been unable to come
before the Court is ... to call in question the force as res judicata of the operative
clause of the Judgment,21
Since ... the question of a State's capacity to be a party to proceedings is a matter
which precedes that ofjurisdiction ratione materiae ... this finding must as a matter
of construction be understood, by necessary implication, to mean that the Court at
that time perceived the Respondent as being in a position to participate in cases
before the Court.22
Furthermore, the majority indicated it was not necessary to consider questions
concerning the FRY's UN membership at the time of filing the application, or its
alleged acquiescence to the 1996 judgment,23 Accordingly, the Court's judgment
was final and conclusive as to the rights of the parties, thereby providing the
Court with jurisdiction over the merits of the case?
Three judges' findings on jurisdiction did not base their reasoning on res
judicata. Expressing concern in re-examining jurisdiction, since previously
established, Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, in his dissenting opinion, believed
jurisdiction pivoted around the status of the FRY's UN membership at time of
filing. The 'revelations' of UN resolutions and the FRY's subsequent application
in 2000 for 'new' membership did not terminate membership, but resulted in
consequential non-participation as a sanction. The SFRY never ceased
membership and, coupled with the fact that membership was never terminated,
that meant it retained membership despite the breakaway of other states.25
Further, the FRY through its assertions was treated as a continuer. An application
for 'new' membership in 2000 could not retrospectively change the status of
being a continuer between 1992 and 2000, and a successor from 2000 onwards?6
Judge Owada viewed res judicata applying to the entirety of the 1996
judgment as too broad an interpretation of the principle: what was required was
determination of issues within its scope, not automatic application. The critical
question was whether access had been dealt with in the 1996 judgment and thus




23 Genocide case, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocketlindex.php?p1=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, (140).
24 Ibid.
25 Dissenting Opinion ofVice-President AI-Khasawneh, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketlindex.php?p1 =3&k=f4&case=91&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[8].
26 Ibid (10)-[ II).
27 Separate Opinion ofJudge Owada, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
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from the Legality of Use of Force cases ('NATO cases'is due to temporal
differences regarding respective decision-making. 2004 was the first time the
Court had the opportunity to examine the FRY's position in light of all facts,
unlike the legal situation surrounding the 1996 judgment. Thus access, which
logically precedes jurisdiction, must have been contemplated by the Court and
therefore, the judgment made a 'definitive determination' upon it as well,
bringing it within the ambit of res judicata.29 'The Court itself ... is now
precluded from taking a different position at this stage that would be
diametrically opposed to the one that the Court itself is deemed to have so
definitely determined ... ' (emphasis omitted).30
Judge Tomka was concerned that Serbia was invited to present more
jurisdictional arguments; this seemed inconsistent with dismissing the 2003
revision application that found jurisdiction based on res judicata of the 1996
decision. His Excellency considered whether the FRY had access to the Court at
time of filing in 1993 and noted that this was not considered in 1996. His
Excellency was not convinced by the 'strained' majority reasoning that the issue
was perceived through 'necessary implication,.31 Thus the Court should have
considered jurisdiction de novo. Serbia not having access could be remedied, and
did not preclude exercise of jurisdiction ratione personae. His Excellency
distinguished the divergence from this principle in the 2004 case on the basis of
Serbia's then circumstances.32 Since the FRY's claim as continuer had failed,
customary ipso jure succession was explored, where successor states continue
any treaty, in force at time of succession of the predecessor state, unless special
circumstances existed. Through the FRY's 1992 succession it continued the
SFRY's treaty obligations, meaning that Serbia had been bound by the Genocide
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pl =3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[16].
28 Legality ofUse ofForce (Serbia and Montenegro v Belgium) (Preliminary Objections) [2004]ICJ Rep
279; Legality ofUse ofForce (Serbia and Montenegro v Canada) (Preliminary Objections) [2004]ICJ
Rep 429; Legality ofUse ofForce (Serbia and Montenegro v France) (Preliminary Objections) [2004]
ICJ Rep 575; Legality ofUse ofForce (Serbia and Montenegro v Germany) (Preliminary Objections)
[2004]ICJ Rep 720; Legality ofUse ofForce (Serbia and Montenegro v Italy) (Preliminary Objections)
[2004]ICJ Rep 865; Legality ofUse ofForce (Serbia and Montenegro v Netherlands) (Preliminary
Objections) [2004]ICJ Rep 1011; Legality ofUse ofForce (Serbia and Montenegro v Portugal)
(Preliminary Objections) [2004]ICJ Rep 1160; Legality ofUse ofForce (Serbia and Montenegro v
United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) [2004]ICJ Rep 1307; Legality ofUse ofForce(Yugoslavia v
Spain) (Provisional Measures) [1999]ICJ Rep 761; Legality ofUse ofForce (Yugoslavia v United States
ofAmerica) (Provisional Measures) [1999]ICJ Rep 916 ('NATO cases'). Based on the ambiguities of the
FRY's UN membership the ICJ found that as the FRY was not a UN member the Court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the claims made by Serbia and Montenegro. See Klinton Alexander, 'NATO'S
Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating Yugoslavia's National Sovereignty in the Absence
ofSecurity Council Approval' (2000) 22 Houston Journal ofInternational Law 403.
29 Separate Opinion ofJudge Owada, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pl =3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[33]-[34].
30 Ibid [37].
31 Separate Opinion ofJudge Tomka, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pl =3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[21].
32 Ibid [30].
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Convention since 1992 and party to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, jurisdiction and access thus granted?3
Five judges believed the Court did not have jurisdiction and had difficulty
applying res judicata and reconciling the NATO cases. In their joint dissenting
opinion, Judges Ranjeva, Shi and Koroma voiced serious misgivings about
'necessary implications' stemming from the finding of res judicata of the 1996
decision. Reliance on res judicata allowed the Court to overlook two key issues:
Serbia's UN membership, and its obligations under the Genocide Convention.
Reliance on res judicata to establish ratione personae implies the Court discussed
and found access in 1996, which it did not. Thus access cannot come within the
ambit of res judicata.34 The finding in the NATO cases that Serbia was not a UN
member did not have the force of res judicata as it was not between the same
parties. However, if Serbia was not a member in 1999, then it was not in 1993
either.35 Their Excellencies viewed the decision in the NATO cases as correct in
that there the Court felt bound first and foremost to examine the question of
access because of its fundamental importance, and regrettable that this was not
followed here.36
According to Judge Skotnikov, because the NATO cases found Yugoslavia
was not a UN member at the relevant time and therefore not party to the Statute,
the Court concluded Yugoslavia had no access to the Court. This created a legal
reality which could not now be departed from.37 The majority on the other hand
created a 'parallel reality' through applying res judicata and further, they justified
their action as not being ultra vires because a finding ofjurisdiction in incidental
proceedings is absolute and exhaustive. It is contradictory to invite Serbia to raise
jurisdictional arguments at the merits phase, when there had been a finding with
res judicata force in 1996: this invitation could not have been issued if the Court
felt there was no possibility of negating jurisdiction. He concluded res judicata
was not absolute and exhaustive in incidental proceedings, and to view it as so
sharply departs from previous approaches.38
For Judge ad hoc Kreca, in cases where jurisdiction was found at the
preliminary objections stage, but later it was discovered that no such jurisdiction
existed, the use of res judicata would 'commit a manifest abuse of authority' .39
His Excellency noted the distinction between jus standi and jurisdiction and that
having acquired one does not imply existence of the other; jus standi is a
33 Ibid [35]-[36].
34 Joint Dissenting Opinion o[Judges Ranjeva, Shi and Koroma, International Court ofJustice, 26 February
2007




37 Declaration o[Judge Slwtnilwv, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocket/index.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 Mach 2008, 1.
38 Ibid 3.
39 Von Tiedemann v Polish State, Rec. TAM. t VI, 997-1003, (Polish-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal) in
Separate Opinion o[Judge ad hoc Kreca, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocket/index.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[12].
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precondition ofjurisdiction. His Excellency held that 'necessary implication' was
an attempt to force judgment by implication into the separate realm of judicial
reasoning.4o The Court relied on an assumption the FRY possessed the right to
appear before the Court in the 1996 judgment and the assumption acted as an
element of reasoning. His Excellency disputed the legitimacy of this through
comparing the function of judicial and legal assumptions finding that after the
true facts were discovered the assumption should have been abandoned.41
B Responsibility for Genocide
1 Can States Commit Genocide?
Serbia claimed that the meaning of Article IX of the Genocide Convention is
ambiguous and its drafting history showed no intention to include direct
responsibility of the state.42 According to the majority, genocide, as provided for
under Article II of the Genocide Convention, could apply to both individuals and
states.43 '[A]s a matter of general principle, international law does not recognise
criminal responsibility of the State, and the Genocide Convention does not
provide a vehicle for imposing such criminal responsibility.'44 International law
recognises the duality of responsibility of the individual and the state. The
majority saw nothing in the Genocide Convention relating to individual criminal
responsibility that would displace the meaning of Articles I and III, as they
impose oblifations on states distinct from those obligations imposed on
individuals.4
Five judges believed Article I did not make genocide a crime that states could
commit, rather only individuals could commit the crime of genocide. According
to Judges Shi and Koroma, a state cannot be held directly to have committed the
crime of genocide, consistent with the object and purpose of the Genocide
Convention, as it does not impose criminal responsibility on the state per se.46
According to the ordinary meaning of the treaty's terms, read in their context and
in light of its object and purpose, the Genocide Convention is directed against
individuals, not states. The responsibilities of State Parties are found in Articles
V to VIII, and are aimed at preventing and punishing individuals who commit the
crime of genocide. There was no intention that a state party should punish itself
for the crime of genocide. Their Excellencies disagreed with the majority's
interpretation by implication or logic of Article I as imposing upon a state the
obligation not to commit genocide. Primary regard must be given to the parties'
intention at the time the treaty was concluded; Article IV places the responsibility
40 Ibid [40].
41 Ibid [44]-[47].
42 Genocide case, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-




46 Joint Declaration ofJudges Shi and Koroma, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketlindex.php?p1=3&k=f4&case=91&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[1].
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for the crime on the individual. The Genocide Convention does not entitle the
Court to hold a criminal trial.47
Judge Owada viewed Article I as excluding from its scope the issue of direct
responsibility of a state for the commission of genocide as an international crime
of the state. The Genocide Convention prevents and punishes genocide by
prosecuting individuals who commit the criminal act with dolus specialis,
whether acting as organs of a state or otherwise. Article I outlines that genocide,
whenever perpetrated, is a crime under international law and lays down the legal
obligation upon the contracting parties to prevent and punish genocide. It is on
the basis of Article IX, however, that parties have substantive obligations under
the Genocide Convention. Therefore the Court can examine the issue of Serbia's
state responsibility arising out of alleged acts of genocide committed by
individuals and entities whose actions can be attributed to Serbia under the law of
state responsibility.48
Judge Tomka also believed that Article I makes genocide a crime of
individuals, and not the state. Article I only makes state parties obligated to
prevent the commission of the crime and to punish the perpetrators.49 Like Judge
Owada, his Excellency believed that the Court could determine international
responsibility of a state for genocide on the basis of attribution to the state of the
act perpetrated by a person. This Court, however, is not the appropriate forum in
which to make a finding that genocide was committed. so Judge Skotnikov did not
believe in the existence of state criminal resRonsibility, but rather that state
responsibility could be imputed for certain acts.SI Furthermore, the Court cannot
establish individual criminal responsibility for genocide committed by persons
capable of engaging a state's responsibility since it lacks criminal jurisdiction.52
3 Was Genocide Committed?
In determining the nature and existence of the acts alleged, the Court
acknowledged the findings of the ICTY that it relied on heavily to establish the
factual background. Relevant institutions, organisations and groups in operation
47 Ibid [4).
48 Separate Opinion ofJudge Owada, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docketJindex.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[73).
49 Separate Opinion ofJudge Tomka, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docketJindex.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[60).
50 Ibid [61).
51 Declaration ofJudge Skatnikav, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docketJindex.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
4-5.
52 Ibid 6.
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in Bosnia53 were critical in establishing Serbia's responsibility for genocide, as
Bosnia alleged close political and financial ties existing between the Serbian
government and authorities of the Republika Sprska, and regarding
administration and control of the Republika Sprska's army ('VRS ,).54 Allegedly
Serbia, under the guise of protecting the Bosnian-Serb population, 'conceived
and shared with [the VRS] a vision of a "Greater Serbia" in pursuit of which it
supported those responsible for the allegedly genocidal acts'.55 The allegation
was founded on 'Strategic Goals' articulated by President Karadzic on 12 May
1992 and on consistent conduct of Serb military and paramilitary forces showing
an overall specific genocidal intent (dolus specialis) vis-a-vis non-Serb
Bosnians.56 The majority found Serbia was providing 'considerable financial and
military support' to the Republika Sprska and 'had it withdrawn that support, this
would have greatly constrained the options that were available to the Republika
Sprska authorities' .57
To determine whether genocide had been committed, the Court considered if
the protected group, Bosnian Muslims, had been subject to any conditions set out
in Article II of the Genocide Convention. Were any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the protected group?
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.58
In considering whether there had been killings of members of the group,59 the
majority stated '[Serbia] does not deny that crimes were committed during the
53 On IS October 1991 Bosnia declared independence, as did the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia on
9 January 1992 (later called Republika Sprska). The following armed units were active in hostilities:
Yugoslav People's Anny ('JNA'), subsequently Yugoslav Anny ('VJ'); volunteer units supported by the
JNA and VJ, and the FRY's Ministry of the Interior ('MOV'); municipal Bosnian-Serb Territorial
Defence detachments; and pol ice forces of the Bosnian-Serb Ministry of Interior. On IS April 1992 the
Bosnian Government established the Army of the Republic of Bosnia merging several non-official forces
including a number of paramilitary defence groups including the Green Berets and the Patriotic League,
the military wing of the Muslim Party of Democratic Action: Genocide case, International Court of
Justice, 26 February 2007






58 Genocide Convention, opened for signature 9 December 1948,78 UNTS 277, art 11 (entered into force 12
January 1951).
59 Evidence was examined to detennine whether killings of members of the protected group occurred in the
principal Bosnian areas and the various detention camps: SuSica camp; Fo~a Karazneno-Popravni camp;
Omarska camp; Keraterm camp; Trnopolje camp; Manja~a camp (Banja Luka): above n 53, [262]-[271],
[305]-[310].
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siege of Sarajevo, crimes that "could certainly be characterized as war crimes and
even crime against humanity", but it does not accept that there was a strategy of
targeting civilians'.60 Based on overwhelming evidence, the majority concluded
that massive killings had occurred in specific areas and detention camps durinJf
the conflict and the victims were in large majority members of the group.
Despite this, the dolus special is requirement could not be met as the killings were
not conducted with specific genocidal intent,62
The Srebrenica killings were examined separately. In examining intent, the
majority discussed the Trial Chamber of the ICTY's finding in Prosecutor v
Radislav Krstic where 'following the takeover of Srebrenica in July 1995, the
Bosnian Serbs devised and implemented a plan to execute as many as possible of
the military-aged Bosnian Muslim men present in the enclave' .63 All executions
systematically targeted Bosnian Muslim men of military age, regardless of
civilian or military status.64 This conclusion was confirmed by the ICTY Appeals
Chamber; the loss of one fifth of Srebrenica's overall population 'would
inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population
at Srebrenica' .65 The majority found the dolus specialis 'was not established until
after the change in the military objective and after the takeover of Srebrenica on
or about 12 or 13 July,.66 They concluded genocidal acts falling within the ambit
of Articles I1(a) and (b), and with the specific intent to destroy in part the group
of Bosnian Muslims6- were committed at Srebrenica by members of the VRS from
about 13 July 1995. 7
Regarding 'causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group',
even though it was 'established by fully conclusive evidence that members of the
group were systematically subjected to massive mistreatment, beatings, rape and
torture during the conflict ... and, in particular, in the detention camps', a
specific intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part, was absent,68
Furthermore, regarding 'deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part', though
there was 'convincing and persuasive evidence that terrible conditions were
inflicted upon detainees of the camps', again the Court was of the view that the
dolus specialis was absent,69 Regarding 'imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group' and 'forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group', it was found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that




63 (Judgment), IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, [87) (ICTY Trial Chamber) ('Krsti{;') in ibid [292].
64 Krsti{; (Judgment), IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, [546) (ICTY Trial Chamber) in ibid.
65 Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic (Appeals Chamber Judgment), IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, [28-33) (ICTY
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Bosnia argued that despite absence of an official statement of aims reflecting
genocidal intent, the dolus specialis of those directing the events 'is clear from
the consistency of practices, particularly in the camps, showing that there was a
pattern of acts committed "within an organized institutional framework"'. 71 The
majority viewed the Decision on Strategic Goals as providing for population
transfers but not evidence of a genocidal dolus specialis.72 The majority also
rejected Bosnia's further argument that 'the pattern of the atrocities committed
across many communities, over a lengthy period and focussed !sic] on Bosnian
Muslims and also Croatians, demonstrates the necessary intent'.7
In his dissenting opinion, Vice-President AI-Khasawneh found that Serbia
should have been found responsible as principal actor and the Court should have
inferred genocidal intent from the consistent pattern of conduct. In Krstic Appeal,
the Appeals Chamber held that ethnic cleansing can be evidence of the mens rea
of genocide and that intent may be inferred from the crime's factual
circumstances. The majority found population transfer was one way of achieving
the Bosnian Serbs' strategic goals, however the Court should have also found
those goals were being achieved through massive killings of members of the
protected group.74 His Excellency indicated regret that the Court did not more
closely consider the consistent recent jurisprudence of the international criminal
tribunals on the permissibility, and even the necessity, of relying on facts and
circumstances from which to infer dolus specialis.7s
On the other hand, Judge ad hoc Kreca believed intent should not be inferred
from acts, and the law applied by the ICTY is different from that to be applied in
the present case. The ICTY Trial Chamber erred in inferring genocidal intent
from facts. 76 Intent may only be inferred if it satisfies quantitative and qualitative
standards. When looking at qualitative conditions, the inferential element must
consist of acts capable of objectively producing genocidal effects or being
constitutive of genocide. 'Deduction of genocidal intent from acts which per se
cannot have genocidal effects ... cannot be considered as acts in terms of Article
II of the Convention.'77 The law applied by the ICTY regarding genocide cannot
be considered the same as the law of genocide under the Genocide Convention.
Judge Skotinkov also had difficulties reconciling Krstic, where genocidal intent
may be drawn even where the individuals to whom the intent is attributable are
not precisely identified. His Excellency concluded that the finding of the




74 Dissenting Opinion ofVice-President AI-Khasawneh" International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pI=3&k=f4&case=9I&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
(41).
75 Ibid (43), (47).
76 Separate Opinion ofJudge ad hoc Kreca, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p I=3&k=f4&case=9l&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
86, (ISO).
77 Ibid (ISO).
78 Declaration ofJudge Skotnikov, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
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3 Can the Genocide be Attributed to Serbia?
The Court examined whether the Srebrenica genocidal acts could be attributed
to Serbia. By thirteen to two the Court found that under rules of state
responsibility, responsibility could not be attributed to Serbia79 through its organs
or persons whose acts engage responsibility.80
The majority first considered whether there was conduct of state organs
directly attributable to the State.81 Bosnia claimed 'all officers in the VRS,
including General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serb forces,
remained under FRY military administration ... up to 2002' and argued they
were 'de jure organs of the FRy,.82 The majority found '[t]he functions of the
VRS officers, including General Mladic, were however to act on behalf of
Bosnian Serb authorities, in particular the Republika Srpska, not on behalf of the
FRY; they exercised elements of the public authority of the Republika Srpska,.83
The Srebrenica genocide could not be attributed to Serbia as there was no
evidence the genocide had been committed by persons or entities ranking as
organs of the Serbian government,84 Furthermore, Bosnia alleged the Scorpions
were a state organ of the FRy.85 In referring to the Court's jurisprudence, the
majority stated that
persons, groups of persons or entities may, for purposes of international
responsibility, be equated with State organs even if that status does not follow from
internal law, provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in 'complete
dependence' on the State, of which they are ultimately merely the instrument,86
According to the majority therefore Serbia was not responsible for the conduct
of the Scorpions as it could not be ~roved the Scorpions were at the relevant time
in mid-1995 a de jure87 or de facto8 organ of the FRY.
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=9l&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 Mach 2008,8-
9.
79 In establishing whether the genocidal acts could be attributed to Serbia the majority relied on the
customary international law of state responsibility as provided in the International Law Commission's,
'Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act' in the Report ofthe
International Law Commission, Fifty-third Session (23 April-I June and 2 JuljrlO August 2001), UN
GAOR, 561h sess, Supp No 10,68-74, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001)('ILC articles').
80 Genocide case, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocket/index.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=91&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, [471].
81 Article 4 of the ILC articles, Conduct ofOrgans ofa State, provides that
'(I) The conduct ofany State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law. whether the organ
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the
Stale, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or ofa territorial unit of the State. (2) An organ
includes any person or entity which has that slatus in accordance with the internal law of the State': ILC articles, above
n 79, 84.
82 Genocide case, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&k=f4&case=91&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, [387].
83 Ibid [388].
84 Ibid [395].
85 The Scorpions were a paramilitary militia that Bosnia alleged was the 'MUP of Serbia' and 'a unit of
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Nor, according to the majority, were the massacres committed on or under the
FRY's instructions, or direction and control.89 The majority found Serbia not
responsible under international law, as no factual basis had been established for
finding that Serbia had the requisite direction or control over the operations in the
course of which the massacres were perpetrated.90 In reaching this conclusion the
majority relied on the 'effective control' test as provided by the IC] in Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States
ofAmerica)91 and not the 'overall control' test of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Prosecutor v Miroslav Tadii:92 thereby rejectin~ Bosnia's claim of overall control
exercised by the FRY over the Bosnian Serbs.9
According to Vice-President AI-Khasawneh, however, the Court should have
applied the 'overall control' test as 'when the shared objective is the commission
of international crimes, to require both control over the non-State actors and the
specific operations in the context of which international crimes were committed
is too high a threshold' .94 Regarding Belgrade's knowledge of activities at
Srebrenica, '[t]here can be no doubt that President Milo~evic was fully appraised
of General Mladic's (and the Bosnian Serb army's) activities in Srebrenica
throughout the takeover and massacres' .95 His Excellency refers to the majority's
statement '[f1urthermore, the Court notes that in any event the act of an organ
placed by a State at the disposal of another public authority shall not be
considered an act of that State if the organ was acting on behalf of the public
authority at whose disposal it had been placed,.96 There is no evidence that the
Scorpions were placed at the disposal of another public authority. A factual
interpretation was needed, namely the Scorpions were controlled by Serbia as
they were described as 'MUP of Serbia' or 'a unit of Ministry of Interiors of
Serbia,.97
The Vice-President believed the Court should have relied on statements of the
new Serbian government because their intent was to acknowledge the previous
89 Article 8 of the ILC articles, Conduct Directed or Controlled by a State, provides that '[t]he conduct ofa
person or group of persons shall be considered an act ofa State under international law if the person or
group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction and control of, that State in
canying out the conduct': ILC articles, above n 79, 103.
90 Genocide case, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=9l&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, [412].
91 (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14,62 ('Nicaragua').
92 (Appeals Chamber Judgment), IT-94-I-A, 15 July 1999, [122] (ICTY Appeals Chamber) ('radic').
93 Genocide case, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pI=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, 402, 404.
94 Dissenting Opinion o/Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketlindex.php?p1=3&k=f4&case=91&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[39].
95 Ibid [51].
96 Genocide case, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocketlindex.php?p I=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, [389].
97 Dissenting Opinion o/Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[53]-[55].
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regime's responsibility and 'admit' past wrongs.98 Serbia's unilateral statement
was more than political: 'declarations made ... b~ highly placed government
officials can have binding legal consequences'. 9 The following statement
amounted to an admission of the responsibility of President Milo~evic's regime
for the Srebrenica genocide:
Given the continuity of State responsibility, despite the change in regime, th[e]
statement [by the Serbian Council of Ministers] acknowledge[s] the facts or
conduct unfavourable to the State making the statement, and on the basis of
Nicaragua thereby amounts to a form of admission, or ... evidence of the truth of
the facts it asserts. IOO
Further, by thirteen to two the Court found that Serbia had not conspired to
commit genocide, nor incited the commission of genocide, under the Genocide
Convention. 101 By eleven to four, the Court found Serbia not complicit in
genocide under the Genocide Convention. I02 Regarding complicity, Judge Keith
assessed President Milo~evic's relationship with General Mladic and concluded
that Milo~evic must have known the VRS had formed the intent to destroy in part
the protected group thereby making Serbia complicit in genocide. For complicity
to be established, Serbia must have had knowledge of the principal perpetrator's
genocidal intent (but need not share that intent) and with that knowledge have
provided aid and assistance to the perpetrator. 103
4 Did Serbia Fail to Prevent and Punish Genocide?
By a twelve to three majority the Court found that Serbia breached its
obligation to prevent genocide. According to the majority the obligation is one of
conduct and not one of result and states must 'employ all means reasonably
available to them, so as to prevent genocide as far as possible' .104
In view of their undeniable influence and of the information, voicing serious
concern, in their possession, the Yugoslav federal authorities should, in the view of
the Court, have made the best efforts within their power to try and prevent the
tragic events then taking shape, whose scale, though it could not have been
foreseen with certainty, mi~ht at least have been surmised.... [F]or a State to be
held responsible for breachmg its obligation of prevention, it does not need to be
proven that the State concerned definitely had the power to prevent the genocide; it
IS sufficient that it had the means to do so and that it manifestly refrained from
using them. lOS
98 Following the fall of the MiloSevic regime, the new Serbian Government expressed condemnation of the
Srebrenica crimes and demanded the criminal responsibility ofall who had committed war crimes: ibid
[56], [58].
99 Ibid [57].
100 Ibid [60] (emphasis omitted).
101 Genocide case, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pI=3&k=f4&case=9 I&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, [471].
102 Ibid.
103 Declaration ofJudge Keith, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=9l&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, [7].
104 Genocide case, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pI=3&k=f4&case=9l&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, [430].
105 Ibid [438].
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For the majority, the FRY 'was in position of influence, over the Bosnian
Serbs ... unlike that of any of the other States parties to the Genocide
Convention' .106 It 'could hardly have been unaware of the serious risk of
[genocideJ once the VRS forces had decided to occupy the Srebrenica
enclave'. I 7 It was not shown Serbia 'took any initiative to prevent what
happened', the inference being 'that the organs of the Respondent did nothing to
prevent the Srebrenica massacres' .108
Judges Shi and Koroma agreed that, to be consistent with the relevant Security
Council resolutions, Serbia should have attempted to prevent the July 1995
Srebrenica genocide. The Security Council resolutions should have supported
this finding, instead of the various hypotheses put forward in the judgment. A
breach of an obligation to prevent requires identification of a 'clear missed
moment of opportunity to act' and in Security Council Resolution 819 (16 April
1993) the Security Council noted that the FRY should take all measures within
its power to prevent the commission of genocide. The Security Council's
decision with respect to 'Srebrenica and its surroundings', together with its
concerns about war crimes and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in
Srebrenica, suggests that some real opportunities had presented themselves for
the Bosnian-Serb leadership to have acted to try to prevent genocide. ,09 'Mr
Milo~evic, even though it has not been proven that he had effective control over
the Bosnian Serb leadership, could and should have exerted whatever pressure he
had at his disposal given the humanitarian directives concerning Srebrenica .. .'110
On the other hand, three judges did not believe that Serbia breached any
preventive obligation. According to Judge Tomka, the duty of states to prevent
genocide can be fulfilled if a state exercises control over certain persons in their
activities abroad. Article I places an obligation on the state 'to prevent genocide
outside its territory to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction outside its territory,
or exercises control over certain persons in their activities abroad'. III '[I]t has not
been established that [the FRY] exercised jurisdiction in the areas surrounding
Srebrenica .. , nor that it exercised control over the perpetrators who conducted
the killings' and further, the FRY did not know in advance of the plan to execute
as many of the military aged Bosnian Muslims as possible.112 Judge Skotnikov
believed the Court relied on a 'politically appealing, but legally vague ... concept




109 Joint Declaration ofJudges Shi and Koroma, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocket/index.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=9I&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[6].
I 10 Joint Declaration ofJudges Shi and Koroma, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocket/index.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=9 I&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[7].
111 Separate Opinion ofJudge Tomka, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocket/index.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=9l&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, [67].
112 Ibid [68].
96 UNSW Law Journal Volume 31(1)
subjective notion of influence'. The Court should not have interpreted the duty to
prevent as a duty of conduct, but rather as a duty of result. I 13
Judge ad hoc Kreca also believed Serbia had not breached any preventive
obligation and distinguished the duty to prevent in legal tenns from preventive
measures defined by the Genocide Convention. Breach of the legal duty is dealt
with in tenns of criminal law, whereas breach of a duty to undertake the
preventive measures stipulated is equivalent to a treaty violation. I14 His
Excellency believed the argument of 'position of influence' confuses the notions
of 'influence' and 'power' and their effects in the area of prevention of genocide.
'Influence' is not a means of preventing genocide; it requires a longer time than
the duration of the Srebrenica operation. I IS As to the argument concerning
awareness of the general risk of genocide, in civil wars the risk of ethnically
motivated crimes, including genocide, is always high and serious. His Excellency
believed that the argument that Serbia had not taken any initiative to prevent
shows both legal and factual difficulties. Factually, it is unclear how President
Milo~evic's warning to President Karadzic, of the risk of a massacre at
Srebrenica does not represent fulfilment of the duty to act, as such a warning was
the only possible preventative action where the risk of genocide arose in another
state's territory. Legally, the element of causality is missing, as it has not been
shown that the alleged failure to act caused the massacre. 116
By fourteen to one, the Court found that Serbia breached its obligation to
punish genocide by violating its duty to cooperate with the ICTY in its failure to
transfer General Mladic, accused of genocide and complicity in genocide, to the
ICTy. 1I7
This failure constitutes a violation by the Respondent of its duties as a party to the
Dayton agreement, and as a Member of the United Nations, and accordingly a
violation of its obligations under Article VI of the Genocide Convention ... One of
those requirements is that the State whose responsibility is in issue must have
'accepted [the] jurisdiction' of that 'international penal tribunal'; the Court thus
finds that the Respondent was under a duty to co-operate with the tribunal
concerned pursuant to international instruments other than the Convention, and
failed in that duty. liB
Judge Skotinkov supported the finding that Serbia failed to do everything in its
power to apprehend General Mladic. Further, the FRY authorities did not act on
the Court's orders as they should have and if they had, then 'this could have had
113 Declaration ofJudge Skotnikov, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocket/index.php?p1=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
10.
114 Separate Opinion ofJudge ad hoc Kreca, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007




117 Genocide case, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocket/index.php?pI=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, [448).
118 Ibid [449].
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an effect of averting many of the atrocities other than genocide' .119 Serbia must
cooperate with the ICTY in respect of individuals accused of genocide. 120
Judge ad hoc Kreca, however, distinguished the duty to punish from the duty
to institute proceedings against persons accused of genocide and found that:
To charge the Respondent with lack of cooperation with the ICTY on the basis of
the fact that one of the indicted persons has not been arrested, and in the absence of
credible evidence that he is on the Respondent's territory, runs counter to the
principle that negative facts are not subject to bein~ proved in the judicial
proceedings ... I am of the opinion that a State that dehvered to the ICTY in the
described way 37 indicted individuals, including almost the complete political and
military leadership, could hardly be accused of lack of cooperation in terms of a
proper judicial reasoning. 121
Further, by thirteen to two the Court found that Serbia failed to comply with
provisional measures ordered by the Court as it failed to take all measures within
its power to prevent genocide. 122 By fourteen to one Serbia was required to
immediately comply with its obligations to punish genocidal acts and to transfer
individuals to the ICTy. 123
C Reparations
By thirteen to two the Court held that finding Serbia breached obligations to
prevent and punish genocide constituted appropriate satisfaction and that
compensation, or a direction to provide assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition were not appropriate in the present case. 124 As restitution was not
possible, it was inappropriate to hold Serbia responsible for restitutio in
integrum. Whilst Bosnia sought compensation, the Court concluded that its
anticipation extended beyond the single instance of genocide found and the
finding Serbia breached its obligations of prevention and punishment only.12s
Even though the Court's findings limited Bosnia's claim, a claim for damages
was legitimate.
For the majority, the possibility of symbolic financial compensation required a
'sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act ... and the
injury suffered by [Bosnia], consisting of all damage of any type, material or
119 Declaration ofJudge Skotnikov, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
10.
120 Ibid II.
121 Separate Opinion ofJudge ad hoc Kreca, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pl =3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
(130).
122 Genocide case, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pI=3&k=f4&case=9I&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, (471).
123 Ibid.
124 Genocide case, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocketlindex.php?pI=3&k=f4&case=9 I&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, (469).
125 Ibid [64(r)]. Serbia breached the Convention through inaction to prevent genocide, rather than actual
genocide or complicity to it: ibid [450]. Bosnia claimed Serbia was obliged to pay both in its own right
and as parens patriae for its citizens and claimed damages as reparations in relation to personal and
property injury as well as to the Bosnian economy and environment.
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moral' .126 The Court had to be satisfied that the Srebrenica genocide would have
been averted if Serbia had acted in compliance with its legal obligations.
Reverting back to the factual conclusions the majority was not satisfied of this.
No nexus could be established and hence the. Court held that 'financial
compensation is not the appropriate form of reparation for the breach of the
obligation to prevent genocide' .127 Satisfaction was the appropriate form of
reparation and declaration of Serbia's past and continuing violations of
international obligations constituted satisfaction.128
Judges Shi and Koroma relied on the principle that the ICJ cannot impose
payment of damages on states. During negotiations of the Genocide Convention
the forum rejected a proposed amendment that if an individual was acting on
behalf of the state the ICJ could issue orders for cessation and damages. The
Convention does not entitle the Court to hold a criminal trial, nor impose on the
State an obligation to pay damages or to provide for them in domestic
legislation. 129 Accordingly, the focus of the Convention is on the punishment of
genocide and any extension in responsibility beyond the criminal field is
unsupported. 130
Judge ad hoc Kreca believed responsibility under Article IX of the Genocide
Convention did not contain any components of civil responsibility, reparation or
compensation. While Article IX's travaux preparatoires mention civil
responsibility, this is not enough to find its existence, contrary to the Genocide
Convention's provisions. 13l Judge Tomka viewed the Convention as restricting
findings to criminal responsibility, thus also excluding states' civil
responsibility.132 For Judge Skotnikov, when a state acknowledges responsibility
for a breach of the Genocide Convention, the Court does not need to establish
whether genocide occurred and may proceed to the reparations issues. But Judge
Skotnikov could not find the Srebrenica massacre could be classified as
genocide. 133
On the other hand, Vice-President AI-Khasawneh believed that the Court's
findings in operative clauses five and seven were not appropriate satisfaction.
The majority's approach was incorrect as it enabled reaching conclusions that
were contradictory to the facts, absolving Serbia of responsibility (except for the
126 Ibid [462).
127 Ibid.
128 UK v Albania (Corfu Channel Case) [1949) ICJ Rep, 35 (,Corfu Channel Case') in ibid [463].
129 Joint Declaration ofJudges Shi and Koroma, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketJindex.php?pl =3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[4].
130 Ibid.
131 Separate Opinion ofJudge ad hoc Krei:a, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketJindex.php?pl =3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[131), [135].
132 Separate Opinion ofJudge Tomka, International Court ofJustice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketJindex.php?pl =3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[61).
133 Declaration ofJudge Skotnikov, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.orgldocketJindex.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=9l&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[7), [9].
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duty to prevent/punish). As Serbia should have been held responsible for
genocide as principal and accomplice, the findings in operative clause five and
seven did not constitute appropriate satisfaction. There was an admission of
responsibility for the acts in Srebrenica by the Serbian Council of Ministers,
which amounted to genocide. 134 If the Court had considered the issues using
'more appropriate methods' there would have been more positive findings
regarding Serbia's international responsibility,I35
Regarding guarantees and assurances of non-repetition of Serbia's
substantiated violations, the majority concluded that a declaration of satisfaction
was sufficient. 136 Finally, the decision that financial compensation was not
appropriate was extended beyond breach of the duty to prevent and punish
genocide: it was also held to be inappropriate as a form of symbolic reparation
and in relation to the failure to comply with the Provisional Measures of 8 April
and 13 September 1993. 137
IV COMMENT
The judgment in the Genocide case reflects an outcome not polarised with
clear 'winners' and 'losers'. President Higgins noted the decision overall did not
completely satisfy either side, but stressed 'that does not mean, of course, that the
court has been seeking a political compromise' .138 According to Professor Shaw
the judgment avoided a verdict that would have provoked further political
conflict inside Serbia,139 The Court opted for a 'safe' decision as 'bold decisions
have awkward repercussions'. 140 Despite this the decision has resulted in divided
opinion amongst Bosnians and Serbs.
The Court's conclusion has angered many Bosnians, who view the judgment
as defeat and as undermining their suffering and the loss of over 7 000 lives,141
On the other hand, in Serbia the judgment was positively viewed; Serbia was not
held responsible for the more serious and substantial crime of genocide nor for
134 Dissenting Opinion a/Vice-President AI-Khasawneh, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docketJindex.php?pl=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008,
[61].
135 Ibid [62].
136 Genocide case, International Court of Justice, 26 February 2007 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docketJindex.php?p1=3&k=f4&case=91&code=bhy&p3=4> at 26 March 2008, [466].
137 Application a/the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment a/the Crime a/Genocide (Bosnia and
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complicity, but rather obligations to prevent and cooperate. Thus Serbia has not
been further internationallr isolated, 'it is clear now that not all Serbs did what
was done in Srebrenica'. 42 After the decision was handed down Republika
Srpska's Prime Minister Dodik officially apologized to Bosnia highlightin~
however, that all parties were involved in atrocities committed during the war. I ~
The Serbian government has not taken such a step.
A Res Judicata
It is regrettable that jurisdiction occupied such a large amount of the Court's
time and resulted in such extensive and contradictory judicial consideration. The
fact that jurisdiction lay in the Court finding the 1996 judgment had res judicata
force and that this finding carried with it 'necessary implications' is problematic.
Eight judges l44 expressed serious concern with rather simplistic classification of
the 1996 judgment as res judicata and that being the end of the matter. Their
main concern was the lack of explanation behind the reasoning as to the
application of res judicata, especially in the face of seeming inconsistency with
the NATO cases. In the NATO cases, Serbia and Montenegro's UN membership
was deemed not to have existed at the relevant time, and thus it was not granted
effective access to the Court. The Court's finding on jurisdiction in the Genocide
case is thus at odds with the NATO cases, although in them there was no res
judicata issue. 145
Whilst the NATO cases did not have binding force of res judicata, as they
were not between the same parties, the fact that inconsistencies were not drawn
out and discussed by the majority has left room for confusion and contradiction
as predicted in the dissenting opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh. 146 Yet, it
is also acknowledged that the Court's application of res judicata to the 1996
judgment successfully allowed the Court to avoid a difficult situation. Had the
Court examined jurisdiction de novo, it would have been faced with either setting
aside its own previous ruling and throwing out the case on a preliminary
objection after 14 years of litigation, or finding against the NATO cases. Thus
reliance on res judicata, though a very formalistic approach, enabled it to avoid
142 Bruno Vekaric in Vesna Penc Zimonjic, 'Rights: Belgrade Held Not Guilty of Genocide in Bosnia,'
Globallnfonnation Network (New York), 26 February 2007, I.
143 SwissPeace, Bosnia and Herzegovina: conflict and cooperation (2007)
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this dilemma. 147 Furthermore, the finding of jurisdiction under Article IX, has
clarified the previously ambiguous scope of the Articleicle and its effect on
states.
The Court's dealing with issues of jurisdiction undoubtedly contributed to the
lengthy 14 year proceedings. Jurisdiction was raised in the 1996 and 2003
judgments, and again entertained in 2007. Further, since the final basis of
jurisdiction was established through the application of res judicata to the 1996
findings, such a lengthy, cautious approach can been seen as 'an excess of
procedural caution' resulting in extended proceedings and impacting upon the
Court's ability to render expeditious justice. 148 However, the importance of the
Court's clarification that it had effective jurisdiction cannot be undervalued.
B Dolus specioUs
The case clearly illustrates difficult evidentiary issues in establishing the dolus
specia/is of genocide. Bosnia strongly argued that intent should be inferred from
the widespread killings that occurred on Bosnian territory. The Court adopted a
strict approach to establishing the dolus specia/is and would not infer genocidal
intent from widespread killings, finding that only one instance of genocide had
occurred, that of July 1995 at Srebrenica. The Court had difficulty on the
question of inferring the dolus specia/is from conduct and struggled to reconcile
contemporary practice in international criminal law with an interstate claim. This,
coupled with the Court's refusal to consider certain evidence, made the task of
establishing the dolus specia/is all the more difficult.
Professor Antonio Cassese has attacked the judgment as demanding 'an
unrealistically high standard of proof .149 For others it 'was unfortunate' the
Court declined to find genocide occurred in other instances of mass killings and
rapes across Bosnia. ISO According to Professor Dworkin, however, genocide is
something serious and cannot be applied in all circumstances, thereby supporting
the Court's finding that Serb intentions regarding the Bosnians were far from
clear '[i]f the campaign was at its core an attempt to remove the Bosnian
Muslims from a particular patch of territory, rather than eradicate all or many of
them, it was not genocide in the terms of the 1948 convention'.' 151 Given this
absence of clarity, to equate Serbia's conduct with the Armenian and Jewish
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genocides seems inappropriate. Furthennore, a pronouncement by the Court of
Serbia's responsibility for genocide would have further polarised an already
volatile region. 152 Despite this argument, President Higgins, has denied that the
judgment was a political compromise. 153 Nevertheless, Posner argues that it still
remains an open question whether the proceedings 'may end up illustrating the
limits of international law, rather than vindicating its ideals' .154
C State Responsibility,
There appeared to be some confusion regarding the nature of the responsibility
of the state under the Genocide Convention. The Court established that through
use of Article IX, it has the power to detennine questions of state responsibility
in relation to both acts of genocide and failure to prevent. Such clarification is of
obvious value to the development of international law and paves the way for
future cases claiming state responsibility for this morally repugnant crime. Five
judges emphasised that states cannot commit genocide and concern was raised by
Judges Tomka and Skotnikov, going a step further to stress that the Court was
not the appropriate forum for the detennination of individual criminal
responsibility. 15
Certain documents that may have provided the causal link between the Serbian
government and the VRS were not allowed as evidence by the Court as the ICTY
pennitted them to remain classified due to Serbia's national security concerns, a
classification which the ICJ would not be able to respect if it were to examine the
documents. Vice-President Al-Khasawneh believed the Court provided
inadequate reasons for not examining the documents, such as state soverei~nty, a
fear of taking sides or embarrassment if Serbia refused the Court's order. l 6 This
sets a standard whereby 'other states with genocidal ambitions may similarly be
successful in withholding evidence ... that would be dispositive of specific
intent. ,157
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Even though the Court applied the test of effective control, it did not give
sufficient reasons as to why it could not apply the overall control test. Despite
evidence of close association, the Srebrenica genocide could not be attributed to
Serbia nor was Serbia directly complicit in acts of genocide. For Bosnians much
grief stemmed from the Court stopping short of finding Serbia responsible for the
Srebrenica genocide. 158 The ICJ 'has retarded decades of lawmaking in the area
of accountability for mass atrocities' as it should not have drawn a legal and a de
facto distinction between the VRS and the FRY, as there was a relationship
between the official leadership of the FRY and the armed forces of Republika
Srpska. 159 This is again indicative of the Court struggling with principles of
international criminal jurisprudence in an interstate claim.
D Failure to Prevent and Cooperate
The case is important as it found there was a positive duty to prevent the
occurrence of genocide, and that Serbia violated this duty. The Court, however,
failed to outline the scope of the prevention duty. The judgment missed an
opportunity to
give the international community some guidance on the content of the positive
obligations to prevent the occurrence of what constitutes the gravest of crimes
against humanity, and on the appropriate measures for redress and rehabilitation of
its victims. '6o
Even more problematic is the position of a state willing and able to take
measures but without any jurisdiction over territory or control over persons, as
highlighted by Judge Tomka. 161
The case is significant in finding that Serbia failed in its duty to fully
cooperate with the ICTY in surrendering outstanding war criminals, who are
suspected to be harboured in Serbia, for prosecution, thereby violating its
obligation to cooperate fully with the Tribunal under Article VI of the Genocide
Convention. For Professor Cassese, holding Serbia in violation of the Genocide
Convention 'can pose all sorts of problems for Belgrade, unless it acts quickly
and makes arrests' of key war criminals. '62 This can be positively viewed as
fostering further cooperation between Serbia and the ICTY concerning the
surrender of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The Presidency of the
European Union ('EU'), upon the delivery of the judgment, called upon Serbia to
now take steps to 'distance itself from the crimes committed by the Milosevic
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regime' .163 The Presidency called for Serbia to make all efforts to cooperate with
future endeavours of international criminal justice by not ceasing to protect war
criminals suspected of hiding in Serbia. 164
The ruling has an impact reaching beyond Serbia, as it can be inferred that any
country sheltering Karadzic and Mladic would now be considered to be in
violation of the Convention. Furthermore, the ruling will affect other fugitives, in
particular those accused in the Rwanda genocide. According to Professor David
Scheffer, the ruling confirmed that "'all states have an obligation" to take action
against people accused of genocide "and part of that is apprehending them'" ,165
which can only be achieved through state cooperation.
E Reparations
Satisfaction through declaration of the Court was the only reparation deemed
appropriate. Despite finding Serbia in breach of obligations to prevent and punish
the Srebrenica genocide, the Court could not find a direct causal nexus between
Serbia's actions (or inaction) and loss suffered. The Court's approach has been
criticised, with suggestions that the burden of proof should have shifted to
Serbia, requiring it establish that despite it takin~ appropriate measures, the tragic
events at Srebrenica would have still unfolded.' 6 Furthermore, concern has been
expressed in relation to the Court's use of Corfu Channel Case l67 in holding
satisfaction as appropriate reparation. Given that the nature and consequences of
the two cases differ so greatly, the 'satisfaction is appropriate' principle should
not be so readily applied. 168
Bosnia's overall disappointment was reinforced through the Court's refusal to
deal with reparations, which is viewed as a trivialisation of their suffering and the
lives lost. Fatija Suljic, who lost her husband and three sons in Srebrenica has
responded '[t]his makes me cry. This is no verdict, no solution. This is disaster
for our people' .169 The fact that the Court did not find upon the more substantial
merits was of obvious disappointment for Bosnia, which was left without
concrete remedy. Serbia, on the other hand, was relieved that it did not have to
pay damages. Had the Court found Serbia responsible for genocidal acts or
complicity, the Court would have been more likely to hold Serbia responsible for
financial reparations, which would have seriously impacted on Serbia's fledging
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economy.170 Further, the declaratory findings already act as a moral stigma upon
a state that maintains that the loss during the war was not solely perpetrated by
one side.
The Court's finding on reparation can also be more positively viewed. Had
financial compensation been awarded it is possible a challenge to that
compensation would have followed, thereby preventing the region from reaching
closure. l7I Another argument in support of the Court's approach is that the ICJ is
not an appropriate forum to accurately calculate adequate compensation for the
loss of 7 000 lives and property. Such logic would not, however, pertain to
awarding symbolic compensation.
Finally, it can be argued that the already strained Balkan regional relations
would have been under further pressure, had Serbia been ordered to pay
damages. Rather, there are now hopes for reconciliation. EU High Representative
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, expressed praise for
this aspect of the judgment, and applauded the fact that 'there is no collective
punishment' and that 'the highest tribunal in the world has closed that page,.172
The EU Presidency, currently dealing with further incorporating the region into
the EU, also focused on the importance of regarding the verdict as a step towards
reconciliation and urged all sides to respect the judgment. 173
V CONCLUSION
This was a long and difficult case for the Court, which struggled with complex
jurisdictional issues and the appropriateness of finding a State responsible for
genocide. Notwithstanding this, the fact that a state can clearly be held
responsible under international law for violations of the Genocide Convention
makes the case most important.
Aside from the Court protracting the jurisdiction question for so many years
and, to some degree, blurring the distinction between public international law and
international criminal law in resolving an interstate dispute, the case has left
several important issues unresolved. The Court did not clarify the status of the
FRY's UN membership nor did it reconcile inconsistencies with the NATO
cases. The Court also did not clarify the appropriateness of using rules of
international criminal law in determining whether there can be inference of
genocidal intent from acts. Nor did the Court clarify when financial reparations
are appropriate. Indeed, the majority's underplaying of reparations and holding
that the declaratory finding amounted to 'appropriate satisfaction' seems an
ironic and disappointing conclusion.
The case has placed the parties further apart than ever. Even though the
judgment eased Serbia's domestic and international position, the Bosnians view
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it as a defeat. The overall effect of the judgment appears disappointing as the case
will neither reconcile the parties nor will it bring them closer together. It is
nonetheless hoped it is a positive step playing some role in healing the residual
wounds of war.
